Islam is a tool for evil*. The sooner you get it the sooner Human Rights equality can reach and release islam's suffering victims!* It's an open secret that islam will loose its racist/sexist attraction in the very moment it conforms with basic Human Rights equality.
Peter Klevius question: How can BBC staff and politicians sleep at night - well knowing they are lying about Syria and the suffering they themselves are accomplices to?
Syria war would stop in the very moment West stops supporting the Saudi dictator family. However, BBC and some politicians continue the Saudi evil - and accuse Syria and Russia for what in reality is almost entirely up to the Saudi "ally".
The current CIA director John Brennan, who joined the CIA in 1980 and was a station chief in Saudi Arabia and the chief of the national counterterrorism center, thinks Mohammad bin Salman is a nice guy:
Mohammad bin Salman did not go abroad to university, choosing to remain in Riyadh where he attended King Saud University, graduating in sharia "law". Associates said he neither smoked nor drank and had no interest in partying.
BND, the German intelligence agency, portrayed Saudi defense minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, as a political gambler who is destabilizing the Arab world through proxy wars in Yemen and Syria.
On 24 September 2015, 2,236 Hajj pilgrimage attendees were killed by an event now called the Mina Stampede, which sources claim was due to attempts by the personal convoy of Mohammed bin Salman to force itself through the crowd, and due to several road closures in the area.
Here's an other close friend of John Brennan
and here's what he's doing
Paul Sperry, author of “Infiltration: How Muslim Spies and Subversives Have Penetrated Washington.”: Counterterrorism experts have long suspected Saudi Arabia’s “rehabilitation” center for terrorists does a poor job of de-radicalizing jihadists. But a Saudi detainee at Guantanamo Bay now reveals it’s actually a recruiting and training factory for jihad.
According to recently declassified documents, senior al Qaeda operative Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi told a Gitmo parole board that the Saudi government has been encouraging previously released prisoners to rejoin the jihad at its terrorist reform school, officially known as the Prince Mohammed bin Naif Counseling and Care Center.
The Obama administration has praised the effectiveness of the Saudi rehab program — which uses “art therapy,” swimming, ping-pong, PlayStation and soccer to de-radicalize terrorists — and conditioned the release of dozens of Gitmo prisoners, including former Osama bin Laden bodyguards, on their enrollment in the controversial program.
To date, 134 Saudi detainees have been transferred to the Saudi reform camps in Riyadh and Jeddah. Last year, nine Yemeni detainees were sent there, as well, and more are expected to follow over the next two months, as President Obama strives to meet his campaign goal of closing Gitmo.
Al-Sharbi dropped a bombshell on the Gitmo parole board at his hearing earlier this year when he informed members that the Saudi kingdom was playing them for suckers. “You guys want to send me back to Saudi Arabia because you believe there is a de-radicalization program on the surface.
“True. You are 100 percent right, there is a strong — externally, a strong — de-radicalization program. But make no mistake, underneath there is a hidden radicalization program,” al-Sharbi added. “There is a very hidden strong — way stronger in magnitude — broader in financing, in all that.”
Al-Sharbi is one of the longest-serving, and most unrepentant, prisoners at Gitmo. A Saudi national with an electrical engineering degree from King Fahd University, he attended a US flight school associated with two of the 9/11 hijackers. He traveled to Afghanistan in the summer of 2001 and trained at an al Qaeda camp, building IEDs to use against allied forces.
Al-Sharbi was captured March 28, 2002, at an al Qaeda safehouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan, with senior al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah. According to his US intel dossier, he told interrogators that “the US got what it deserved from the terrorist attacks on 9/11.”
Given a chance at parole after 14 years, however, al-Sharbi was surprisingly frank with the board.
He explained that Riyadh is actively recruiting and training fighters to battle Iranian elements in neighboring Yemen and Syria. Saudi views Shiite-controlled Iran as a regional threat to its security.
“They’re launching more wars and the [United] States is backing off from the region,” he said. “They’re poking their nose here and here and there and they’re recruiting more jihadists, and they’ll tell you, ‘Okay, go fight in Yemen. Go fight in Syria.’ ”
Al-Sharbi said the Saudis also are “encouraging” former detainees “to fight their jihad in the States.”
“It’s not like a past history,” he said. “It’s increasing.”
A growing body of evidence backs up his claims. Last month, for example, a WikiLeaked email from Hillary Clinton revealed, citing US intelligence sources, that Saudi Arabia has provided “clandestine financial and logistic support to” ISIS and other Sunni terrorist groups in the region.
Al-Sharbi said the kingdom is playing a double game.
“They will proudly tell you they will fight terrorism,” he said. “That means they will support it.”
Al-Sharbi told the Gitmo board he doesn’t want to enroll in the Saudi rehab program, because he would be used to “fight under the Saudi royal cloak.”
“This is in the cause of a king. This is not a true jihad,” he said. “And I’m not going to Saudi unless I am sure they’re not gonna be using me.”
The Saudi rehab ruse has carried a lot of weight with the Gitmo parole board. Earlier this year, it released “Saudi al Qaeda recruiter and fighter” Muhammed Al Shumrani after his lawyers insisted that repatriating him to Saudi Arabia and enrolling him in its “well-established reintegration program” would cure his admittedly “problematic behavior.”
Last year, the defense team of longtime bin Laden bodyguard Abdul Rahman Shalabi insisted that the same Saudi rehab program would make sure he’s reformed. In approving his release, the board said that it was “confident about the efficacy of the Saudi program.”
In both cases, US intelligence warned the board that the hardened terrorists would more than likely “re-engage in terrorist activity.”
By Riyadh’s own numbers, some 20 percent of the terrorist enrollees at its rehab club — which features golf carts, palm trees and an Olympic-size pool — go back to the jihad, returning to the ranks of the Taliban or al Qaeda. US officials believe the recidivism rate is much higher, but Saudi Arabia does not disclose criteria for evaluation.
One high-profile failure was Said Ali al-Shihri. After his graduation from the Saudi program, he returned to Yemen, where he ran an al Qaeda branch and helped plan the deadly bombing of the US Embassy and mastermind the failed plot to blow up a 2009 Christmas flight over Detroit, before a drone-fired missile finally caught up to him.
The Saudi center is more holiday resort than halfway house for paroled inmates. Jihadists are rewarded with gourmet meals, video games, ping-pong, jacuzzis and newly furnished private apartments reserved for conjugal visits. They also are allowed unescorted visits to family members. In September, the center granted “beneficiaries” Eid al-Adha holiday vacation for 12 days.
Graduates are further rewarded with young brides and new cars.
Lending credence to al-Sharbi’s charges, the three-month program includes a few hours a day of lessons in Islam from Saudi clerics and “Shariah specialists.”
“Beneficiaries spend 15 hours a week in the Shariah program,” according to a local Jeddah press report, which is triple the amount of time devoted to psychological counseling.
Al-Sharbi’s parole was declined; he is still in Gitmo, along with 60 detainees — down from the 241 who were there when Obama started his term.
But with the administration rushing to reduce that number even further before the end of Obama’s term, how many more jihadists will be released into this highly suspect program?
Congress has an obligation to ask hard questions: Is this a pre-emptive campaign to prevent terror attacks or more likely an incubator for facilitating more attacks?
The CIA’s director John Brennan told Al Arabiya News Channel that “there was no evidence” of a Saudi involvement in the 9/11 attacks.
However, there are 29 pages, not 28, numbered 415 through 443 in the congressional inquiry into the 9/11 attacks. And deletions on the pages — sometimes words, often whole lines — add up to the equivalent of a total of three pages. So we still are not being given the full story.
It is instantly apparent that the widely held belief for why the pages were not initially released — to prevent embarrassing the Saudi royal family — is true.
The pages are devastating:
Page 415: “While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support and assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government.… [A]t least two of those individuals were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence officers.”
Page 417: One of the individuals identified in the pages as a financial supporter of two of the 9/11 hijackers, Osama Bassnan, later received a “significant amount of cash” from “a member of the Saudi Royal Family”during a 2002 trip to Houston.
Page 418: “Another Saudi national with close ties to the Saudi Royal Family, [deleted], is the subject of FBI counterterrorism investigations.”
Pages 418 and 419: Detained al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida had in his phone book the unlisted number for the security company that managed the Colorado residence of the then-Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan.
Page 421: “a [deleted], dated July 2, 2002, [indicates] ‘incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists inside the Saudi Government.’”
Page 426: Bassnan’s wife was receiving money “from Princess Haifa Bint Sultan,” the wife of the Saudi ambassador. (Her correct name is actually Princess Haifa bint Faisal.)
Page 436: The general counsel of the US Treasury Department, David Aufhauser, testified that “offices [of the Saudi charity al-Haramain] have significant contacts with extremists, Islamic extremists.” CIA officials also testified “that they were making progress on their investigations of al-Haramain.… [T]he head of the central office is complicit in supporting terrorism, and it also raised questions about [then-Saudi Interior Minister] Prince Nayef.”
And here's the Saudi dictator family's "peaceful" branch.
Saudi based and steered OIC is all Sunni muslims Umma organization, which has declared the most basic Human Rights obsolete if they aren't sharia compliant.
Date: 2014-09-27 15:15
Send our love to Chelsea, Marc and Grandpa. Can't wait to meet Charlotte.
On Aug 19, 2014 9:22 AM, "H" wrote:
Agree but there may be opportunities as the Iraqi piece improves.
Also, any idea whose fighters attacked Islamist positions in Tripoli, Libya?
Worth analyzing for future purposes.
*From*: John Podesta [mailto:email@example.com]
*Sent*: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 09:19 AM
*Subject*: Re: Here's what I mentioned
Hit send too soon. Meant to say Syria elements are vexing.
On Aug 19, 2014 9:17 AM, "John Podesta" wrote:
> I think we are headed down this path in Iraq, but the Syria elements are
> On Aug 17, 2014 3:50 PM, "H" wrote:
>> Note: Sources include Western intelligence, US intelligence and sources
>> in the region.
>> 1. With all of its tragic aspects, the advance of ISIL
>> through Iraq gives the U.S. Government an opportunity to change the way it
>> deals with the chaotic security situation in North Africa and the Middle
>> East. The most important factor in this matter is to make use of
>> intelligence resources and Special Operations troops in an aggressive
>> manner, while avoiding the old school solution, which calls for more
>> traditional military operations. In Iraq it is important that we engage
>> ISIL using the resources of the Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Regional
>> Government (KRG), and what, if any, reliable units exist in the Iraqi
>> Army. The Peshmerga commanders are aggressive hard fighting troops, who
>> have long standing relationships with CIA officers and Special Forces
>> operators. However, they will need the continued commitment of U.S.
>> personnel to work with them as advisors and strategic planners, the new
>> generation of Peshmerga commanders being largely untested in traditional
>> combat. That said, with this U.S. aid the Kurdish troops can inflict a
>> real defeat on ISIL.
>> 2. It is important that once we engage ISIL, as we have now
>> done in a limited manner, we and our allies should carry on until they are
>> driven back suffering a tangible defeat. Anything short of this will be
>> seen by other fighters in the region, Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, as
>> an American defeat. However, if we provide advisors and planners, as well
>> as increased close air support for the Peshmerga, these soldiers can defeat
>> ISIL. They will give the new Iraqi Government a chance to organize itself,
>> and restructure the Sunni resistance in Syria, moving the center of power
>> toward moderate forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In addition to air
>> support, the Peshmerga also need artillery and armored vehicles to deal
>> with the tanks and other heavy equipment captured from the Iraqi army by
>> 3. In the past the USG, in an agreement with the Turkish General Staff,
>> did not provide such heavy weapons to the Peshmerga, out of a concern that
>> they would end up in the hands of Kurdish rebels inside of Turkey. The
>> current situation in Iraq, not to mention the political environment in
>> Turkey, makes this policy obsolete. Also this equipment can now be
>> airlifted directly into the KRG zone.
>> 4. Armed with proper equipment, and working with U.S. advisors, the
>> Peshmerga can attack the ISIL with a coordinated assault supported from the
>> air. This effort will come as a surprise to the ISIL, whose leaders
>> believe we will always stop with targeted bombing, and weaken them both in
>> Iraq and inside of Syria. At the same time we should return to plans to
>> provide the FSA, or some group of moderate forces, with equipment that will
>> allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against
>> the Syrian regime. This entire effort should be done with a low profile,
>> avoiding the massive traditional military operations that are at best
>> temporary solutions. While this military/para-military operation is moving
>> forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence
>> assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
>> which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and
>> other radical Sunni groups in the region. This effort will be enhanced by
>> the stepped up commitment in the KRG. The Qataris and Saudis will be put
>> in a position of balancing policy between their ongoing competition to
>> dominate the Sunni world and the consequences of serious U.S. pressure. By
>> the same token, the threat of similar, realistic U.S. operations will serve
>> to assist moderate forces in Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, where
>> insurgents are increasingly fascinated by the ISIL success in Iraq.
>> 6. In the end the situation in Iraq is merely the latest and most
>> dangerous example of the regional restructuring that is taking place across
>> North Africa, all the way to the Turkish border. These developments are
>> important to the U.S. for reasons that often differ from country to
>> country: energy and moral commitment to Iraq, energy issues in Libya, and
>> strategic commitments in Jordan. At the same time, as Turkey moves toward
>> a new, more serious Islamic reality, it will be important for them to
>> realize that we are willing to take serious actions, which can be sustained
>> to protect our national interests. This course of action offers the
>> potential for success, as opposed to large scale, traditional military
>> campaigns, that are too expensive and awkward to maintain over time.
>> 7. (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S.
>> Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the
>> city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces
>> were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground
>> support for moderate government forces.)
>> 8. If we do not take the changes needed to make our security
>> policy in the region more realistic, there is a real danger of ISIL
>> veterans moving on to other countries to facilitate operations by Islamist
>> forces. This is already happening in Libya and Egypt, where fighters are
>> returning from Syria to work with local forces. ISIL is only the latest and
>> most violent example of this process. If we don’t act to defeat them in
>> Iraq something even more violent and dangerous will develop. Successful
>> military operations against these very irregular but determined forces can
>> only be accomplished by making proper use of clandestine/special operations
>> resources, in coordination with airpower, and established local allies.
>> There is, unfortunately, a narrow window of opportunity on this issue, as
>> we need to act before an ISIL state becomes better organized and reaches
>> into Lebanon and Jordan.
>> 9. (Note: It is important to keep in mind that as a result of
>> this policy there probably will be concern in the Sunni regions of Iraq and
>> the Central Government regarding the possible expansion of KRG controlled
>> territory. With advisors in the Peshmerga command we can reassure the
>> concerned parties that, in return for increase autonomy, the KRG will not
>> exclude the Iraqi Government from participation in the management of the
>> oil fields around Kirkuk, and the Mosel Dam hydroelectric facility. At the
>> same time we will be able to work with the Peshmerga as they pursue ISIL
>> into disputed areas of Eastern Syria, coordinating with FSA troops who can
>> move against ISIL from the North. This will make certain Basher al Assad
>> does not gain an advantage from these operations. Finally, as it now
>> appears the U.S. is considering a plan to offer contractors as advisors to
>> the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we will be in a position to coordinate more
>> effectively between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army.)